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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

COMMON LAW MARRIAGES IN PENNSYLVANIA
PAUL

E.PENDEL*

In reading what may be called the "judicial rider" to the decision of the
Superior Court of Pennsylvania in Fisher v. Sweet & MdClain, 154 Pa. Superior
Court 216, 35 A. 2d. 756, "that a valid common-law marriage cannot hereafter
be entered into in this Commonwealth without first complying with the Act of
(May 17,) 1939, (P. L. 148, 48 P. S. § 20 et seq.) and securing a marriage license
pursuant to its provisions," several questions occur to the mind of the reader
which cause speculation as to whether those questions were considered by the
court before arriving at its unusual, if not unique, pronouncement. And this is
especially true after a study of the Act and a consideration of the general principles
of law relating to marriage and common-law marriages, as well as the constitution
of our state.
This declaration by the court is unique, because it is a decision upon a point
which was neither raised nor involved in the case before it, and because appellate
courts have informed the Bar time and again, and particularly lawyers who have
suffered by the application of the rule, that they will not pass upon questions
that have not been raised in the court below and properly brought before the
appellate tribunal. Not only that-they have refused the expression of opinion
on 'questions unnecessary to the decision of the case, and have constantly avoided
the declaration of rules in matters where they have not received the full benefit
of argument and briefs by counsel. In this case such aid was entirely lacking.
Of course, it may be that the Court, befoe coming to its conclusion, considered
-the several objections that can be urged against its decision and nevertheless decided as it did, and it may be too that those questions did not occur to those
members of that tribunal who joined in the declaration so pronounced. This
doubt therefore must linger in the minds of the Bar until the matter shall be
decided after full argument, submission of briefs and a thorough consideration
of the objections that can be raised against the logic of the declaration there made.
But whether considered or not, the conclusion of the Court, as it appears to the
writer, cannot be sustained under the Act of 1939. The natural and constitutional
rights of individuals which will be considerably impaired in some respects and
destroyed in others by a liberal construction of the Act as claimed for it by the
Court are far too important to be disregarded so lightly.
This discussion, while concerned principally with the effect of the court's
liberal interpretation of the Act of 1939 upon common-law marriages, will also
touch upon other features of the statute to show its vulnerability to attack upon
constitutional grounds.
*Editor: Lackawanna Jurist. Reprinted from the Jurist with the permission of the author.
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In the first place, although the statute may be considered a health measure,
it must not be forgotten that, in view of the "natural rights of persons" affected
by it and the penalties attaching to violations of its provisions, the Act is penal
and must receive a strict construction. This is particularly true if persons entering
into common-law marriages are to be brought within the sweep of its commands;
because there is nothing in the phraseology of its language that can reasonably
be construed to show that the legislature intended to alter or change in any way
the manner of contracting marriages according to the common law. The statute
simply provides that "No license to marry shall be issued until there shall be in
the possession of the clerk of the orphans' court a statement signed by a duly
licensed physician of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania that each applicant,
within thirty days of the issuance of the marriage license, has submitted to an
examination to determine the existence or nonexistence" of the disease therein
singled out. It does not provide that "no marriage, either ceremonial or commonlaw, may be entered into heeafter" until such certificate or statement shall be
filed with the derk of the orphans' court, with a penalty of nullity if contracted
in violation of its terms. Yt this is how the statute would read in effect if the
conclusion of the Superior Court is to stand. Such conclusion, it is submitted, is
not warranted by any fair reading of the act. Supplying such intendment is purely
judicial legislation-a function that has been disclaimed by the Court as late as
Goff v. Shenandoah Borough, 154 Pa. Superior Ct. 239, 243, 35 A. 2d. 900, 901
(January 27, 1944, the same day as the decision in the Fisher case). Moreover,
if the legislature had intended to affect common-law marriages it could have said
so in clear and express language. It knew of the existence of this "institution"
and of its recognition by all the courts of this Commonwealth down through
our history. Why, then did it vemain silent upon the subject if it intended any
change in the formation of such marriages? The answer is plain that it did not;
and even if it did, but did not say so, the omission may not be supplied by any
court.
Another point that must be considered is, that the Act does not even provide
for the nullity of ceremonial marriages contracted without compliance with its
provisions. As stated in 35 Am. Jur. 188, § 15, "The general rule, however, is
that statutes which direct that a license must be issued and procured, that only
certain persons shall perform the ceremony, that a certain number of witnesses
shall be present, that a certificate of marriage shall be signed, returned, and recorded, and that perosns violating the conditions shall be guilty of a criminal
offense, are addressed to persons in authority to secure publicity and to require a
record to be made of the marriage contract. Such statutes do not void commonlaw marriages unless they do so expressly, even where such marriages are entered
into without obtaining a license and are not recorded." Compare Zeigler v. P.
Cassidy's Sons, 220 N. Y. 98, 115 N. E. 471. See-also 48 P. S. § 2. And in
the same volume of that authoritative work, 35 Am. Jur. at page 192, § 19, in
speaking of statutes requiring health certificates of men before entering into
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marriage, it is said: "Statutes may, and in many jurisdictions do, require a man
to secure, the certificate of a licensed practitioner of medicine that he is free from
venereal disease and to present it to the public officer in order to obtain a marriage license, but failure of compliance with such a statute generally does not
prevent the validity of a marriage, at least a common-law marriage."
A further objection to the construction placed upon that Act by the Superior
Court is that any attempt to bring common-law marriages within its terms will
render the Act void because of defective title. It is submitted that no fair reading
of its title will put any person on notice that common-law marriages are affected
by its provisions; in fact, the most careful reading of the statute will not give him
any further information upon the point. To get that meaning, such person would
have to possess a degree of clairvoyance far beyond that of the average person,
even though such intention had been in the mind of the legislature.
Then too, the provision for summary conviction of persons charged with
violations of the Act must run counter to the constitutional provision guaranteeing
the right of trial by jury. In this respect, it is submitted, there are several possikle
and probable factual situations which should, by right, be left to the decision of a
jury and not to the whim or caprice of a magistrate. What if a physician passes
an applicant in good faith-as he has a right to do under the statute-although
the applicant he has examined is infected with the disease but not in a stage "which
is likely to become communicable," and later it turns out that he was mistaken
in his judgment and a prosecution follows--is his reputation and life's work to
be placed at the mercy of the minor judiciary, or is he to be given the opportunity
of proving his innocence and defending his good name before a jury of his peers?
Surely, he ought to be allowed the forum where his rights will be given the fullest
possible protection, as guaranteed by our basic laws, and not be left to the chance
of the erring judgment or biased opinion of one individual. And why should
not any other person charged with criminality under that Act be protected with
similar rights? Or have we come to the point in our jurisprudence where "shortcuts" are the order of the day, and constitutional provisions designed for the protection of life, liberty and property are now archaic and obsolete? One wonders
at times. Yet, such cases as District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U. S. 63, 51 S. Ct. 52,
75 L. Ed. 177, (1930), although decided fourteen years ago, may still have vitality
enough to render unconstitutional the easy procedure allowed by the Act of 1939
to make a criminal of a person, regardless of his purity of motive or intent in the
premises. Most certainly, if a person charged with a traffic violation, as in that
case, is entitled to a jury trial, a person, such as a physician, or a person in the
exercise of one of his most natural rights-that of entering into marriage-, is
likewise entitled to the same protection.
Finally, since the Act derogates from man's most elemental right-that of
mting-it must receive not only a strict construction, but the strictest construction. That it is designed as a health measure does not entitle it to be a liberal
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interpretation when, as in this case, it is in collision with one of the "certain
inherent and indefeasible rights" of man. Our State Constitution provides (Art.
I, Sec. 1): "All men are born equally free and independent, and have certain
inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and d&fending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing and protecting property and
reputation, and of pursuing their own happiness." Under this clause, it is not a
question of how far a court may go in extending by implication a statute destructive of those rights, but to what extent the state itself may go in impairing those
rights under the guise of regulation, health or otherwise. The trouble with us in
America is that we are constantly prating about our "inherent," our "natural,"
and our "indefeasible" rights at bar banquets, association meetings and patriotic
celebrations, but seem to forget thbm completely in the legislative and judicial
forums, especially in the latter, where courts should ever be on the alert to preserve those rights, regardless of public clamor or the howling of demagogues
who, while pretending to serve the State, are steadily impairing, if not destroying,
those "liberties" and "freedoms" essential to our way of life. What we once considered inalienable rights are now held to be privileges; witness the federal statute
on the making of gifts. Others could be catalogued, but would serve no purpose
bere. One further point, however, must be emphasized. Where courts should be
quite liberal in the construction. of statutes, such as those intended to simplify
litigation or create new remedies, we find them very technical. Thee best illustration of this attitude is the emasculation of the Declaratory Judgments Act, which
today, because of strict construction, does not afford the remedy originally intended
by its enactment. See Borchard, Declaratory Judgments, (2d. Ed.), page 318 et
seq., under the heading "The Pennsylvania Muddle."
On the other hand, statutes, such as the act abolishing breach of promise
suits and actions for alienation of affections, have been sustained by the courts
with amazing alacrity. There has been no strict construction in such cases; no
critical eye upon the constitution to ascertain whether fundamental rights have
been impaired; no regard for the fact that many individuals suffer far more from
such torts than do many others from physical mishaps. And it has all been done
because fraud and perjury have been practised in these claims. But who has ever
had any thought of abolishing assumpsit and trespass actions because of the fraud
and perjury encountered so often in trials of such cases? Yet the injury in the first
class of case may often be greater than in the -other class. A broken home is far
more serious than a broken bone.
While this is somewhat digressive from the main discussion, it nevertheless
throws light upon the attitude of the courts towards individual rights. It seems,
that instead of preserving and enlarging them whenever possible, the judiciary is
restricting or aiding in their restriction whenever opportunity presents itself. The
individual is no longer the important unit he was at one time. The State is now
supreme. What it decrees, is final. Rights once thought to be reserved in the
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people are now found within its "plenary power"; and constitutional limitations
expressed in the eloquent and hopeful language of clauses such as the one guaranteeing to the people the right "of pursuing their own happiness" are becoming
tmpty phrases in constitutions slowly dying because of the failure of the judiciary
in their highest role in the American scheme of constitutional government-that
of protecting the individual from the growing and usurping might of the State.
Upon these considerations, it is submitted, concurrence in the pronouncement
of the Superior Court is impossible. That such restriction on common-law marriages will tend to "eliminate fraud and perjury" is not a sufficient warrant to the
court to invade a field where even the power of the legislature must be exercised
with caution. The right to marry is not created by statute. It existed long before
municipal law was known and will continue to exist long after our jurisprudence
has been buried beneath the dust and ruin of our civilization and life has returned
to its primitive formlessness. Mating is coeval with the sexes. Any interference
with that right must be limited to the most urgent and sternest necessity, and should
only be done by language dearly expressive of the extent to which impairment is
intended, provided, of course, the "extent of impairment" is within the constitutional limit of regulation. It should never be done by implication; least of all,
by a high court, the last bulwark between preservation and destruction of individual
rights, no matter how justified the tnd may seem.

